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Abstract
Due to the fact that a large number of our ethical and behavioural norms
have a conditional form, it is of great importance that deontic logics give an
account of deontic commitments of the form “A commits you to do/bring
about B”. It is commonly agreed that monadic approaches are only subop-
timal for this task since they have several shortcomings, for instance their
falling short of giving a satisfactory account of “Strengthening of the an-
tecedent” or their difficulties in dealing with contrary-to-duty paradoxes.
While dyadic logics are more promising in these respects, they have been
criticized for not being able to model “detachment” ([8]): A and the commit-
ment under A to do B implies the actual obligation to do B. “We seem to
feel that detachment should be possible after all. But we cannot have things
both ways, can we? This is the dilemma on commitment and detachment.”
([15], p. 658)
In this paper I answer A˚qvist’s question with “Yes, we can” by proposing
a general method to turn dyadic deontic logics in adaptive logics allowing
for factual detachment. It is shown that two types of obligations may be de-
tached, proper and instrumental, which in case of violated obligations differ.
Furthermore, a concrete realization based on Lou Goble’s conflict tolerant
CDPM logics ([5]) is presented.
1 Introduction
While monadic deontic logics, i.e. logics employing unary obligation and permis-
sion operators, are powerful tools to model actual and general obligations, there
are several shortcomings concerning their abilities to model conditional obligations.
Since most of our moral or behavioural norms are in a conditional form it is very
important to develop deontic logics which are able to tackle such complications.
There are two canonical ways to represent conditional obligations of the type “Un-
der condition A you’re obliged/committed to bring about B” in unary logics: (i) by
A ⊃ OB and (ii) by O(A ⊃ B). A lot of criticism of such ways of modelling com-
mitment by use of a monadic operator has been published. Prominent arguments
concern the appropriate representation of strengthening of the antecedent (SA),—
if A commits you to do B then A and C commit you to do B. In most situations
the logic is obviously expected to validate (SA). But consider the following case
(A):
∗Research for this paper was supported by the Research Fund of Ghent University by means
of Research Project 01G01907. I am indebted to Joke Meheus and Dunja Sˇesˇelja for comments
on a former draft of this paper.
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A1 In general we’re supposed not to eat with fingers.
A2 Eating asparagus we’re allowed to eat with fingers.
If A1 is modelled by ⊤ ⊃ O¬f , then a ⊃ O¬f is derivable. This obviously is in
conflict with A2, a ⊃ Pf , which is equivalent to a ⊃ ¬O¬f since PA is commonly
defined as ¬O¬A. Similarly problematic is to use O(A ⊃ B) to represent the
obligation B under condition A. In the example we can derive by the inheritance
principle O(a ⊃ ¬f) from O(⊤ ⊃ ¬f).
However, an argument concerning contrary to duty (CTD) obligations is com-
monly considered as the deathblow for any kind of effort in modelling conditional
obligation in a monadic way. A prominent example is given by the so-called
Chisholm Paradox (C) (cp. [2]):
C1 John ought to not impregnate Diane.
C2 If John impregnates Diane, he ought to marry her.
C3 If John doesn’t impregnate Diane, he ought to not marry her.
C4 John impregnates Diane.
It has been argued that deontic paradoxes are due to the lack of a modelling of
the temporal aspect of obligations (cp. [11]). However, Prakken and Sergot have in
[13] presented a version of Chisholm’s paradox which is entirely independent of any
temporal parameters. This shows that earlier hopes to resolve all CTD puzzles by
temporal deontic logics have to be abandoned. Furthermore it motivates research
in non-temporal deontic logics which are able to tackle CTD puzzles.
It is commonly accepted that dyadic approaches can lead to satisfying solutions
with respect to the CTD problems and, as for instance in the case of Goble’s
CDPM [5], there are also ways to tackle problems such as the ones related to
strengthening of the antecedent. Nevertheless, dyadic approaches are criticized
for not giving a satisfactory account of detachment. Detachment is, generally
speaking, to derive the actual obligation to bring about A from the commitment
to bring about A under condition B and the fact B.1 A˚qvist pessimistically stated
“We seem to feel that detachment should be possible after all. But we cannot have
things both ways, can we? This is the dilemma on commitment and detachment.”
([15], p. 658) And indeed most of the existing dyadic logics do not allow for desired
forms of detachment.
The logics presented in this paper are able to detach two types of obligations
which are going to be analyzed in Section 2. In Section 3 I will present a generic
method to turn dyadic deontic logics into adaptive logics that are able to model
detachment. After having introduced the reader into Lou Goble’s system CDPM
in Section 4, I will present in Section 5 a concrete adaptive logic DCDPM based
on this system constructed along the lines elaborated in Section 2 and Section 3.
DCDPM is not only able to model detachment, but also to deal with deontic
conflicts, i.e. situations in which we are committed to do A as well as to do not-
A or some B which cannot be jointly realized with A. A prominent example is
Sartre’s pupil who had problems deciding if he should stay at home to support his
ill mother or if he should rather fight the Nazis. Both obligations are mutually
exclusive. Standard deontic logics lead in such cases to deontic explosion, namely
to the derivability of all obligations. A logic that is able to deal with deontic
dilemmas should, on the one hand, not have explosive characteristics in such cases
and, on the other hand, still be able to derive as much as possible. Lou Goble
presented a system CDPM based on a restriction of the inheritance principle that
1This is usually dubbed factual detachment. There is also deontic detachment (cp. [8]). I give
a more formal account of both later.
2
D
R
A
F
T
is able to satisfy both criteria. This is a good reason to demonstrate the adaptive
handling of detachment on basis of it.
Finally, in Section 6 I suggest some enhancements of the logics.
2 What to detach?
This section clarifies our intuitions about what kind of obligations to detach from
conditional obligations. There is a variety of conceptions concerning the types of
obligations involved in certain setups and their relationships. Furthermore, scholars
disagree about how and when to apply detachment.
Preliminarily it can be said that what should be detached are obligations that
are in some sense ‘actual’ and that in some sense ‘bind us’. These are obligations
whose condition is fulfilled, and that are not ‘cancelled’ or ‘destroyed’ by other obli-
gations. Especially the latter condition deserves a deeper analysis which I am going
to provide in this section. The result will be that there are two types of obligations
that we want to detach. I will dub them instrumental and proper obligations. In
order to explicate these concepts I will first focus on two paradigmatical cases in
which conditional obligations are in a sort of tension: specifity and contrary-to-
duty obligations. This will provide a good basis to entangle the discussion about
the proper detachment in the literature.
Specifity Let us look at an example:
• Being served a meal, we are obliged not to eat with fingers.
• We’re being served a meal.
We write O(¬f | m) for the conditional obligation and m for the second premise.
We sometimes refer to ¬f as being the conclusion and tom as being the antecedent
of the conditional obligation O(¬f | m). Further we will read e.g. P(¬f | m) as
follows: ‘Being served a meal, we’re allowed not to eat with fingers.’ It seems
reasonable to apply factual detachment
O(A | B) B
OA
(FD)
to the two premises in order to derive the ‘actual’ obligation to not eat with fingers.
However, we have to be careful. Norms and obligations are often stated in an
elliptical way, i.e. the conditions are not precise but allow for exceptional contexts.
Consider for instance our asparagus example (A1, A2), O(¬f | ⊤) and O(f | a),
or the weaker version, O(¬f | ⊤) and P(f | a). Often scholars dub such settings
specifity. Formally we can characterize specifity by O(A | B)∧P(D | B∧C)∧P(C |
B)∧B∧C where D ⊢ ¬A. Note that in case B∧C we have no intuitions to detach
OA since D is permitted in the more specific situation B ∧C by P(D | B ∧C) and
D implies ¬A. Furthermore, in the context B ∧ C our obligation O(A | B) is not
violated, rather P(D | B ∧ C) describes an exception to it since we have P(C | B)
which in a sense approves B ∧ C and the permissions and obligations conditioned
for it, such as P(D | B ∧ C). In Example (A) a situation in which we are being
served asparagus as well as the connected obligation O(f | a) are approved by
P(a | ⊤). Thus O(f | a) should not be seen as a violation to O(¬f | ⊤) but rather
as an exception.
More formally we can define, a B ∧ C is an exceptional context to O(A | B)
iff there are P(C | B) and P(D | B ∧ C) where D ⊢ ¬A. We say that O(A | B)
is excepted in such a situation. In our example a is an exceptional context to
O(¬f | ⊤), and O(¬f | ⊤) is thus excepted.
We can contrast this with B∧C being a violation context to O(A | B) iff (i) it is
no exceptional context to O(A | B) and (ii) either (a) A ⊢ ¬C or (b) (P(D | B∧C)
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is valid and A ⊢ ¬D).2 In case of (a) O(A | B) is factually violated by C, in case
of (b) it is violated by P(D | B ∧ C) (and not excepted!).3 In this sense violation
contexts define sub-ideal situations, opposite of exceptional contexts, in which no
obligation is violated. We say that O(A | B) is violated in B ∧ C if B ∧ C is a
violation context to O(A | B). In order to give an example it is better to first
introduce CTD-obligations.
Contrary-to-duty obligations While cases such as the asparagus example are
usually considered as obligations overriding in certain contexts other obligations,
something different seems to be going on in the following example (G):4
G1 Doe is in general obliged not to kill his mother.—O(¬k | ⊤)
G2 However, if Doe kills his mother, he ought to kill her gently.—O(g | k)
G3 Doe kills his mother.—k
Obligations of this kind are usually dubbed contrary-to-duty obligations. For-
mally: O(A | B ∧ C) is a (strong) CTD-obligation to O(D | B) iff A ⊢ ¬D and
A ⊢ ¬C. We call O(A | B) the primary and O(D | B ∧ C) the secondary obliga-
tion. Note that A is inconsistent, both with the antecedent and the conclusion of
O(D | B ∧ C). We define O(D | B ∧ C) as a weak CTD-obligation to O(A | B) iff
only the latter is the case, i.e. A ⊢ ¬C. An example (PA) is
PA1 You should not break your promise.—O(¬b | ⊤)
PA2 If you break your promise you are supposed to apologize.—O(a | b)
Note that in both CTD-cases the primary obligation O(A | B) is (factually) violated
if the antecedent of the secondary obligation is valid and O(A | B) is not excepted.
For instance k is a violation context to O(¬k | ⊤) and analogously for b and
O(¬b | ⊤).
O(A | B) O(A | B) O(A | B)
O(D | B ∧ C) O(D | B ∧ C) O(D | B ∧ C)
(i) (ii) (iii)
Figure 1: (i) Specifity, (ii) strong CTD, (iii) weak CTD. The line indicates incon-
sistency between for instance A and D in (i).
The dissent in the literature There has been some discussion concerning fac-
tual detachment, especially with respect to (strong) CTD-cases such as the For-
rester paradox (G). McNamara argues against detaching (strong) CTD-obligations:
So carte blance factual detachment seems to allow the mere fact that
I will take an action in the future (killing my mother) that is horribly
wrong and completely avoidable now to render obligatory another hor-
rible (but slightly less horrible) action in the future (killing my mother
gently). ([12], p. 268)
First note that for this paper I take it for granted that if an action to bring about
A is unavoidable, e.g. because of physico-causal reasons which are described by X,
2Torre in [19] defines ¬A∧B to be a violation context for O(A | B). However, this distinguishes
them too less from exceptional contexts: if we have ¬f ∧ a then obviously we have ¬f ∧⊤ which
is a violation context in Torre’s sense to O(¬f | ⊤), whereas in our terminology this defines a
exceptional context. Torre also points out that a violation context “distinguishes between ideal
and varying sub-ideal contexts” (p. 3).
3The reader finds an example for (b) in our discussion of the Chisholm Paradox in Section 5.2.
4This version of the Forrester Paradox (cp. [4]) is taken from McNamara [12] (p. 243).
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then a conditional obligation O with conclusion ¬A is excepted by P(A | X) and
thus not violated. Vice versa this means, that if A was avoidable but anyway takes
place and O is not excepted for other reasons, O is violated. In the literature on
CTD-obligations the primary obligation is usually considered to be violated and
thus not to be excepted.
This, O(¬k | ⊤) being violated, is what McNamara has in mind in his criticism:
in the case that Doe cannot be excused for killing his mother since it was ‘com-
pletely avoidable’, but he does it anyway, it seems absurd to detach an obligation
to kill her gently since, after all, the primary obligation binds Doe despite him
acting against it.
Wang in [22] however points out the importance of premise-dependency when
evaluating detachments concerning obligations. He remarks: “the logic should
construct the detachment inference in a way that makes the conclusion be evaluated
in a premise-dependent way.” In order to explicate this notion he reminds his
readers of classical logic: here “B is a logical consequence of A, iff if A is true,
then B is true, where the evaluation of B is given under the evaluation of A,
i.e. B is evaluated in the models where A is true.” In the Gentle Murderer case,
the conclusion to kill the mother gently has the unintuitive appeal highlighted
by McNamara mainly when interpreted in a premise-independent way, namely
when we forget that the evaluation of the conclusion takes place in worlds/models
in which Doe anyway kills her. Of course, isolated, i.e. independent from the
evaluative contraint that he in fact kills her, the obligation to kill his mother
gently is against our moral convictions. However, settling for a premise-dependent
evaluation and accepting the premises G2 and G3, there is nothing which should
cause any unease with our acceptance of the conclusion, that he should kill her
gently.5 Similarly, accepting the conclusion “Doe will win the lottery tomorrow.”
from premises (i) “If Doe knows the lottery numbers and will play them tomorrow,
then he will win.” and (ii) “Doe knows the lottery numbers and will play them
tomorrow.” is unintuitive only in the case that we forget about our commitment
to (i) and (ii), since after all it is very unlikely for anybody to win the lottery.
Opposite to the premise-dependend treatment of conclusions in the case of clas-
sical logic, “the evaluation should [in the case of deontic detachment] be considered
in a defeasible way.”. This is also clear looking again at Example (G): naturally
the antecedent of G1, ⊤, is fulfilled. However the antecedent of the more specific
G2 is also fulfilled, which leads in Wang’s perspective to G1 being defeated.
Wang criticizes McNamara for giving a premise-independent interpretation of
the conclusion for the Gentle Murderer, while “obligatory in the premise [G2] is
interpreted in the evaluative sense, i.e. given that Doe does kill his mother, it is
better that Doe kills her gently, McNamara objects to the conclusion by a moral
sense of the obligation based on what is morally right or wrong.”
Prakken/Sergot point out that the relationship between primary and secondary
obligation in a CTD situation can best be modelled by regarding the secondary
obligation as being relative to a ‘context’ where “a context stands for a constellation
of acts or situations that agents regard as being settled in determining what they
should do.” ([14], p. 224) A “key difference between contrary-to-duty and prima
facie obligations” is that, unlike prima facie obligations and opposite to Wang’s
view, contextual obligations in the sense of Prakken/Sergot do not satisfy any form
of (defeasible) factual detachment. The obligation not to kill is not overridden in
our case, it is fully valid. Furthermore, detaching the obligation to kill gently would
5Along these lines one might of course still object against the premise G2 itself instead of
questioning the inference.
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cause an inconsistency which is “counter to our intuitions”.6
Torre/Tan share in [18] a similar intuition about such cases: In cases such
as the asparagus example they speak of an obligation, e.g. O(¬f | ⊤), being
overridden and cancelled by a more specific obligation, e.g. O(f | a). However,
in CTD situations they use the term overshadowing : for instance O(¬k | ⊤) is
overshadowed by O(g | k) in a situation in which the killing takes place. The
primary obligation, though being violated, is not in any way cancelled or destroyed.
Therefore, they argue, it would be intuitive to derive O¬k, i.e. to apply detachment
to O(¬k | ⊤), while “[t]he consistency of O¬k ∧ Og is a solution that seems like
overkill.” ([20], p. 53) With respect to our terminology it seems to be the intuition
of Torre/Tan that in most cases excepted obligations are being overridden while
violated obligations are being overshadowed.7 It can be argued that Torre/Tan
circumvent the criticism by Wang: they evaluate the conclusion in a premise-
dependent way and it is precisely the nature of contrary-to-duty premises that
justifies and motivates that detachment is not applied to them, but rather to the
more general obligation which is being violated. The intuition is that whether Doe
kills his mother or not, he has the obligation not to kill her and this obligation
binds him. In the former case he violates this obligation.
However, one might ask, what kind of conditional G2 represents, since, although
it is of the form “if . . . , then . . . ”, the logic does in no way allow to detach its
conclusion. Nevertheless, in case of G3, G2 binds Doe in a certain way. This would
with Tan/Torre’s as well as with Prakken/Sergot’s proposal not be represented by
a deontic logic modelling detachment. In fact, both, G1 and G2 are of a binding
nature in case of G3, despite the fact that both conclusions are incoherent. Thus,
I suggest that a proper deontic logic allowing for detachment should be able to
distinguish these cases and to offer an adequate detachment mechanism for both
intuitions.
Instrumental and proper obligations So, who is right, Wang or McNamara,
Prakken/Sergot and Tan/Torre? I would like to suggest: all of them in their own
way. This is due to the fact that different intuitions are in place which are all
justified in their own respect once they are made more transparent.
The way in whichWang is right can be clarified with what Foot dubs ‘obligations
of type 2’ which “tell us the right thing to do” ([3], p. 385). They answer the
question “And what all things considered ought we to do?” (p. 386). We call
these obligations from now on instrumental obligations and we write OiA for the
instrumental obligation to bring about A. They tell us modulo obligations we
violated already, i.e. without considering already violated obligations, what we
should and can bring about.
They seem to correspond to Wang’s intuition. Interpreting the factual premises
as settled and not being anymore avoidable, all-things-considered it is the best
for Doe to kill his mother gently, presupposing that he kills her. Thus, violated
obligations are not candidates for detaching instrumental obligations. Rather are
the violating CTD-obligations the ones which should be detached: in this case to
kill the mother gently. Also, in case a promise is broken the weak CTD-obligation
to apologize should be considered as an instrumental obligation to be detached.
Excepted obligations are no candidates for instrumental detachment: being served
asparagus we are obviously exempted from the obligation to eat with fingers. It
6The only form of detachment contextual obligations satisfy is the following strong detachment
principle: |= (O[B]A∧B) ⊃ OA, where  is the necessity operator of an adequate modal logic.
7However, Torre/Tan did not provide a precise definition, but rather an intuitive characteriza-
tion of overshadowing. In Section 3 I propose a formal definition for these notions. Furthermore
in Footnote 15 I give an example for a violated obligation which is not overshadowed.
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has to be considered as being overridden and the more specific obligation to eat
with fingers should be detached as instrumental obligation.8
Note that instrumental obligations are both ‘actual’ (in our preliminary under-
standing of not being cancelled out or destroyed by another obligation) and they
bind us in the sense of guiding our actions.
The intuition behind Prakken and Tan/Torre’s approach on the other hand
seems to be motivated by the aim to detach what is often called obligations proper,
or actual, or absolute obligations. We call these obligations from now on proper
obligations and write OpA for the proper obligation to bring about A. They tell us,
all-things-considered, what our obligations in a certain situation are, also taking
into account obligations which we might have violated already but which still bind
us. That they are ‘actual’ despite being violated is the conditio that we judge a
violator of being guilty and is being witnessed by us having a bad conscience once
having violated them.
In the case of Example (G), all-things-considered the moral reasons for not
killing his mother are stronger than the reasons for killing her gently: after all,
the obligation to kill her gently is only secondary for the case that he violates the
primary obligation. It provides a practical guideline how to act in the situation in
which the murder takes place, however the obligation proper for Doe is not to kill.9
Thus, we are interested in detaching violated obligations rather than their (strong)
CTD-violaters. This is a key difference to the instrumental case. However, weak
CTD-obligations should be detached as being proper obligations since all-things-
considered we are obliged to apologize in case we break a promise and this obligation
is not in conflict with any more general obligation that would, all-things-considered,
bind us more. Analogously to the instrumental case, excepted oblgations should
not be detached, but rather the more specific obligation which overrides them: it
is our proper obligation to eat with fingers in case asparagus is served.10
Concluding it can be said that proper obligations bind us even in the case that
they are violated by secondary obligations. They are ‘actual’ in our preliminary
understanding since, also in the case of being violated they are not destroyed or
cancelled, or as Tan/Torre put it: they are merely overshadowed.
violated excepted strong CTD weak CTD
instrumental 8 8 4 4
proper 4 8 8 4
Table 1: What is detached? The columns are considered to be mutually exclusive.
In an ‘ideal world’ in which no obligation is violated, both concepts, instru-
mental and proper obligations, coincide. This might very well be a world in which
we eat asparagus or in which other exceptional contexts with respect to some con-
ditional obligations are valid. As discussed, exceptional contexts do not cause
obligations to be violated, although they are excepted. In terms of Torre/Tan,
‘ideal worlds’ in this sense are such that no overshadowing takes place. However,
8Cp. Table 1 for an overview.
9Some dialethists might, opposite to McNamara and Torre/Tan, argue that both, the sec-
ondary and the primary obligation, are proper obligations in the violation context, despite the
fact that they contradict each other. I do not wish to speak the final word on this. It should
however be noted that the dialethist might want to interpret OpA as: (i) the obligation to bring
about A is a proper obligation and (ii) the obligation to bring about A is stronger than all other
proper obligations incoherent with A. I take it for granted that dialethists would rather turn back
the wheel of time in case Doe kills his mother than letting him kill her gently, thus the primary
obligation O(¬k | ⊤) should be considered to be stronger than the secondary O(g | k).
10Cp. Table 1 for an overview.
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as soon as overshadowing enters the scene, our instrumental obligations begin to
differ from our proper obligations, as we have seen for instance with the Gentle
Murderer example. Proper obligations have been violated, but they are still valid.
Example (A) (G) (Gx) (PA)
Premises O(¬f | ⊤) O(¬k | ⊤) O(¬k | ⊤) O(¬b | ⊤)
O(f | a) O(g | k) O(g | k) O(a | b)
P(k | x)
a k x ¬k
proper Opf Op¬k Opg Op¬b,Opa
instrumental Oif Oig Oig Oia
context exceptional violation exceptional violation
over. . . overriding overshadowing overriding overshadowing
relationship specifity CTD (strong) specifity CTD (weak)
Table 2: Overview of the Examples
Note that in the case of the asparagus example proper and instrumental obli-
gations coincide, Opf and Oif , since O(¬f | ⊤) has been excepted. It is also
interesting to contrast the weak CTD in our (PA) example with the Gentle Mur-
derer: the secondary obligation to apologize is coherent with the primary obligation
not to break a promise. Analogous to the Gentle Murderer the primary obligation
gives us a proper obligation, i.e. Op¬b (resp. Op¬k), while the secondary obligation
provides us with a instrumental obligation, i.e. Oia (resp. Oig). However, it also
provides us with a proper obligation, Opa (but not Opg).11
Let us close this section with another instructive example (Gx): Read for in-
stance x as “Doe’s mother is a tyrant who is about to do something very evil
(such as activating an atom bomb, etc.) and the only way to stop her in a certain
situation is to kill her”. From the perspective of some moral standards it might
be argued that in this situation Doe is, if not obliged to kill his mother, so at
least allowed to kill her, P(k | x). Note that x describes an exceptional context,
while k alone describes a violation context with respect to the primary obligation
O(¬k | ⊤). Thus, in the case x or x ∧ k, O(¬k | ⊤) is excepted and not violated.
Hence, as discussed above, neither proper nor instrumental detachment should be
applied to it.
The example is also instructive in another respect: Due to the fact that O(¬k |
⊤) is overridden by P(k | x) and x, the question arises again whether factual
detachment should be applied to O(g | k) or O(g | k ∧ x) in case of x ∧ k. Here
our intuition is, despite O(g | k) being a (strong) CTD-obligation, that we want
to apply factual detachment, not just in the instrumental case, but also in order
to detach it as a proper obligation. This is due to the fact that the corresponding
primary obligation, O(¬k | ⊤), is excepted.
3 Formally realizing detachment
For the formal part we presuppose a propositional calculus which we supplement by
a dyadic obligation operator O for conditional obligations O(A | B) where A and
11Of course, in an ‘ideal’ world there is no need to apologize, thus, the fact that in the case of b
both obligations, to keep the promise and to apologize, are ‘actual’, Prakken/Sergot in [13] call a
‘pragmatic oddity’. Tan/Torre ([20], p. 63) call it counter-intuitive. Taking into account however
that (a) some proper obligations may be violated while other proper obligations might still be
realizable (the ones which are also instrumental obligations such as in our case the obligation
to apologize) and (b) that the two obligations in question are coherent, I do not think this is
counter-intuitive.
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B are propositional formulas and analogously P for permissions.12 Furthermore
we use two monadic obligation operators, Op and Oi, for proper and instrumental
obligations. Where ∧,∨,⊃ and ¬ are the classical logical operators, we add two
further, paraconsistent negations:
p
¬ and
i
¬. The negations are characterized by the
law of excluded middle (LEM), A ∧∼A where ∼ ∈ {
p
¬,
i
¬}. The intended meaning
of
p
¬O(A | B) (resp.
i
¬O(A | B)) is that the commitment to bring about A if B,
is blocked from being detached as a proper (resp. instrumental) obligation. We
therefore alter the rule for factual detachment (FD) as follows:
O(A | B) B ¬
p
¬O(A | B)
OpA
(FDp)
O(A | B) B ¬ i¬O(A | B)
OiA
(FDi)
We restrict our language in such a way that
p
¬ and
i
¬ only precede conditional
obligations. Note that the following is an immediate consequence of (LEM):
¬O(A | B) ⊃ x¬O(A | B) where x ∈ {i, p}. In order to make use of these rules
we have to define rules which govern the overriding and overshadowing of condi-
tional obligations.
Blocking proper detachment The following rule realizes specifity as discussed
in Section 2: excepted obligations are not to be detached as proper obligations.13
(
P(D | B ∧ C) ∨ O(D | B ∧ C)
)
B ∧ C P(C | B) O(A | B) D ⊢ ¬A
p
¬O(A | B)
(Ep)
Note that in our asparagus example,—O(¬f | ⊤), O(f | a), P(a | ⊤)—, we derive
p
¬O(¬f | ⊤) from the given premises, whenever a is the case.
We are furthermore interested in blocking proper detachment in (strong) CTD
cases. While in the case of specifity we block the more general primary obligation,
the situation is now inverse:
O(A | B ∧ C) O(D | B) D ⊢ ¬(B ∧ C) D ⊢ ¬A
p
¬O(A | B ∧ C)
(CTDR)
In the case of the Gentle Murderer we thus derive
p
¬O(g | k) from O(¬k | ⊤).
Blocking instrumental detachment As discussed above, we intend to evaluate
the premises as facts which are not anymore alterable and thus if ¬A is the case
we avoid instrumental obligations such as OiA, since conditional obligations with
conclusion A are de facto violated:
O(A | B) ¬A B
i
¬O(A | B)
(fV)
For instance in the Gentle Murderer case (G) we have k and thus we get i¬O(¬k | ⊤).
Similarly we get in Chisholm’s example (C) i¬O(¬i | ⊤) since we have i where i
stands for ‘John impregnates Diane’.
Furthermore, we prioritize more specific cases over incoherent general obliga-
tions:13,14
(
P(D | B ∧ C) ∨ O(D | B ∧ C)
)
B ∧ C O(A | B) D ⊢ ¬A
i
¬O(A | B)
(oV-Ei)
12The permission operator may also be defined as P(A | B) =df ¬O(¬A | B).
13In logics verifying ⊢ O(A | B) ⊃ P(A | B) (e.g. standard deontic logic) the first condition of
the antecedent can be simplified to P(¬A | B ∧ C).
14This is a heuristic principle used in this paper.
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Note that if the antecedent of rule (oV-Ei) is valid, then either O(A | B) is excepted
(in case P(C | B) is valid), or O(A | B) is violated. As discussed in Section 2, in
both cases we do not want to detach OiA.
For instance in the asparagus case we get i¬O(¬f | ⊤) due to a and O(f | a).
Overriding and overshadowing With our terminology we are able to propose a
precise characterization of overriding and overshadowing: we say that an obligation
O(A | B) is overshadowed iff i¬O(A | B) is derivable and
p
¬O(A | B) is not derivable.
We say that O(A | B) is overridden iff
p
¬O(A | B) and
i
¬O(A | B) are derivable or
¬B is derivable. It is said to be overridden by specifity in the former case, while it
is said to be factually overridden in case ¬B is derivable.15
Realizing detachment by an adaptive logic Extending a given dyadic de-
ontic logic L by the new rules stated above resulting in L+ does not yet give a
satisfactory account of detachment. In order to show this we take a look at two
paradigmatic proofs of example (A) (to the left) and example (G) (to the right):
1 O(¬f | ⊤) PREM
2 O(f | a) PREM
3 P(a | ⊤) PREM
4 a PREM
5 i¬O(¬f | ⊤) 1, 2, 4; (oV-Ei)
6
p
¬O(¬f | ⊤) 1, 2, 3, 4; (Ep)
1 O(¬k | ⊤) PREM
2 O(g | k) PREM
3 k PREM
4 i¬O(¬k | ⊤) 1, 3; (fV)
5
p
¬O(g | k) 1, 2; (CTDR)
Although the logic is able to block undesired applications of the factual detach-
ment rules (FDi) and (FDp), we are not able to apply them where needed. For
instance in the case of the asparagus example (A) we are interested in applying
(FDi) and (FDp) to O(f | a), in the case of the Gentle Murderer we are interested
in applying (FDi) to O(g | k) and (FDp) to O(¬k | ⊤). What we are missing are
means to derive ¬ i¬O(f | a) and ¬
p
¬O(f | a) in the former case and ¬
i
¬O(g | k)
and ¬
p
¬O(¬k | ⊤) in the latter case.
This is where the adaptive logic comes in since these logics allow for condi-
tional applications of certain rules which enable them to interpret a premise set
“as normally as possible” with respect to some given criterion for normality. In our
case we are interested in applying (FDi) (resp. (FDp)) to O(A | B) and B on the
condition that i¬O(A | B) (resp.
p
¬O(A | B)) is not derivable. For instance in the
Gentle Murderer example it would be useful to extend the proof by the following
lines:16
7 Oig 2, 3; (FDi)
c {O(g | k) ∧ i¬O(g | k)}
8 Op¬k 1; (FDp)c {O(¬k | ⊤) ∧
p
¬O(¬k | ⊤)}
In line 7 we apply (FDi) on the condition {O(g | k) ∧ i¬O(g | k)} which is
written in the last column. The idea is, that in case i¬O(g | k) is derived at a later
stage of the proof, we mark all lines that have O(g | k) ∧ i¬O(g | k) as an element
of the condition. The second element of such lines are not anymore considered to
be derivable.
Adaptive Logics The mechanism of adaptive logics has been presented in vari-
ous papers. The space limitations require that we refer the reader interested in a
detailed description of them to [1]. Here we will only mention some key features.
15 Note that this is not a correct characterization of violated and excepted obligations. Say
we have O(¬k | ⊤) and O(g | k) as in (G) and additionally ¬g: O(g | k) is a violated (strong)
CTD-obligation. However, it is not overshadowed and we have i¬O(g | k) and
p
¬O(g | k).
16We write for instance (FDi)c in the third column of the proof in order to indicate that (FDi)
is applied conditionally.
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An adaptive logic in standard format is a triple consisting of (i) a lower limit
logic (henceforth LLL), which is a reflexive, transitive, monotonic, and compact
logic that has a characteristic semantics and contains CL (classical logic), (ii) a set
of abnormalities Ω, characterized by a (possibly restricted) logical form, and (iii) an
adaptive strategy. Formulating an adaptive logic in the standard format provides
the logic with all of the important meta-theoretic features, such as soundness and
completeness (as is shown in [1]).
In the following we use ϕ and ψ as meta-variables for well-formed formulas
of a given language. The proof dynamics is governed by marking conditions for
proof lines. The fact that the proofs are of a dynamic nature makes adaptive logics
very useful for the modeling of defeasible reasoning, since a formula derivable at
one stage of the proof may turn out to be underivable at a later stage. A line
of a proof consists of a line number, a formula, a justification, and a condition.
Conditions are finite subsets of the set of abnormalities. We abbreviate
∨
ϕ∈∆ ϕ
with Dab(∆) for some finite set ∆ of abnormalities. All the rules of the LLL
are valid. The conditions in the fourth column of the proof are carried forward,
i.e. if ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢LLL ψ and the ϕi’s were derived on the conditions ∆i, then the
adaptive logic allows to derive ψ on the condition ∆1∪· · ·∪∆n. Furthermore, if the
following is valid in the LLL, ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ⊢LLL ψ∨Dab(Θ) and the ϕi’s were derived
on conditions ∆i, then the adaptive logic derives ψ on condition ∆1 ∪ · · · ∪∆n ∪Φ.
In order to define the strategy used in this paper some more terminology has
to be introduced. Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-formula at a stage s of the proof iff
it is the formula of a line with condition ∅ and no Dab(∆′) with ∆′ ⊂ ∆ is the
formula of a line with condition ∅. We call the minimal Dab-formulas derivable
with the LLL, the minimal Dab-consequences. A choice set of Σ = {∆1,∆2, . . . }
is a set that contains one element out of each member of Σ. A minimal choice set
of Σ is a choice set of Σ of which no proper subset is a choice set of Σ. Where, for
a premise set Γ, Dab(∆1), . . . ,Dab(∆n) are the minimal Dab-formulas at stage s,
Φs(Γ) is the set of minimal choice sets of {∆1, . . . ,∆n}.
Definition 1 (Marking for minimal abnormality). Line i is marked at stage s iff,
where ϕ is derived on the condition ∆ at line i,
(i) there is no ∆′ ∈ Φs(Γ) such that ∆
′ ∩∆ = ∅, or
(ii) for some ∆′ ∈ Φs(Γ), there is no line at which ϕ is derived on a condition Θ
for which ∆′ ∩Θ = ∅.
Note that a line might be marked at stage s of the proof, but become unmarked
at a later stage s+ i. Indeed, even if Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-formula at stage s,
we might be able to derive Dab(∆′) where ∆′ ⊂ ∆ at stage s + i which may lead
to an alteration of the minimal choice sets and thus to changes in the marking of
lines. Given a set of abnormalities Ω, it is the job of the marking conditions to
determine if lines are “in” or “out” of the proof at a certain stage, i.e. to govern
the internal dynamics of the proof procedure.
In order to define the consequence set of an adaptive logic we are interested in
a stable criterion for derivability.
Definition 2. A is finally derived from Γ on line i of a proof at stage s iff (i) ϕ
is the second element of line i, (ii) line i is not marked at stage s and (iii) every
extension of the proof in which line i is marked may be further extended in such a
way that line i is unmarked.
Γ ⊢AL ϕ (ϕ is finally AL-derivable from Γ) iff ϕ is finally derived on a line of
a proof from Γ.
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Let’s have a look at the semantics: The idea behind the minimal abnormality
strategy is that only the models (of a given premise set) which validate a minimal
set of abnormalities (that is, which are the “minimal abnormal” ones w.r.t. ⊂) are
taken into account.
Definition 3. Γ |=AL ϕ (ϕ is an AL-semantic consequence of Γ) iff ϕ is verified
by all minimally abnormal LLL-models of Γ. A LLL-model M of Γ is minimally
abnormal iff there is no LLL-model M ′ of Γ such that Ab(M ′) ⊂ Ab(M).
Note furthermore that the following completeness and soundness result is valid
for all adaptive logics AL in standard format: Γ ⊢AL ϕ iff Γ |=AL ϕ.
A generic adaptive logic for detachment Given our logic L+ satisfies the
criteria for lower limit logics stated above, we are able to define an adaptive logic
DL+ which models detachment as follows:
• the LLL is L+
• the abnormalities are Ωd =df Ω
i ∪ Ωp where Ωx =df {O(A | B) ∧
x
¬O(A | B) :
A,B ∈ P} for x ∈ {i, p} and P being the set of all propositional formulas;
• the strategy is minimal abnormality.
In the remainder of the paper we demonstrate this by using a variant of Lou
Goble’s CDPM as lower limit.
4 A lower limit: Lou Goble’s CDPM
In order to demonstrate the adaptive modelling of detachment by means of a con-
crete logic we settle for this paper on a variant of Lou Goble’s CDPM as lower
limit logic. This choice is not essential for our approach for handling detachment
by means of an adaptive logic, it is possible to use other logics as lower limit. The
choice however is not arbitrary either since CDPM has many nice properties. For
instance it tolerates deontic conflicts while blocking unintuitive consequences from
conflicting obligations.17 Furthermore, in the absence of deontic conflicts it offers
a close approximation of (dyadic) standard deontic logic.18 One of the main ideas
behind this logic is to restrict the inheritance principle
If ⊢ B ⊃ C then ⊢ O(B | A) ⊃ O(C | A) (CRM)
by adding a further permission statement:
If ⊢ B ⊃ C then ⊢ P(B | A) ⊃
(
O(B | A) ⊃ O(C | A)
)
(RCPM)
This principle is not less intuitive then (CRM) and harmless from the perspective
of standard deontic logic, since there O(A | B) ⊢ P(A | B) is valid and therefore
also the equivalence of (CRM) and (RCPM). However, this principle ensures that
the logic is non-explosive confronted with deontic conflicts.
Lou Goble proposed in [7] two versions of his monadic DPM systems: DPM.1
and DPM.2 where only the latter verifies the rule (P), ⊢ ¬O⊥. In order to ensure
non-explosive behaviour in DPM.2 the aggregation principle had to be restricted
17Neither of the following “deontic explosion principles” is valid in any of the CDPM versions
which are going to be introduced in this paper:
If 0 B then ⊢ (OA ∧O¬A) ⊃ OB (DEX-1)
⊢ (OA ∧O¬A) ⊃ (PB ⊃ OB) (DEX-2)
⊢ (OC ∧ PC) ⊃
`
(OA ∧O¬A) ⊃ (PB ⊃ OB)
´
(DEX-3)
18Lou Goble defines a dyadic version SDDL of standard deontic logic in [6]. It is equivalent to
van Fraassen’s CD of [21] and David Lewis’ VN of [10].
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in a similar way as inheritance. For the conditional version Goble favours the
second version, since in the first one an unintuitive kind of strengthening of the
antecedent (SA) is valid.19 We thus focus for this paper on the system Goble dubs
CDPM.2c. One of the characteristic features of this logic is its handling of (SA).
Goble gives an account of (SA) by restricting rational monotonicity:20
⊢
(
O(B | A) ∧ P(B ∧ C | A)
)
⊃ O(B | A ∧ C) (WRM)
CDPM.2c is defined by adding to all instances of (RCPM) and (WRM) all in-
stances of the following axioms:
⊢ ¬O(⊥ | A) (CP)
If ⊢ A ≡ B then ⊢ O(C | A) ≡ O(C | B) (RCE)
If ⊢ A ≡ B then ⊢ O(B | A) ≡ O(C | A) (CRE)
⊢ O(⊤ | ⊤) (CN)
⊢ O(B | A) ⊃ O(A | A) (QR)
⊢ O(C | A ∧B) ⊃ O(B ⊃ C | A) (S)
⊢
(
O(A | C) ∧ O(B | C) ∧ P(A ∧B | C)
)
⊃ O(A ∧B | C) (CPAND)
Axiom (QR) is in some cases severely counter-intuitive: take the Chisholm example
(C) from page 2. It allows to derive from the commitment to marry Diane in
case John impregnates her, the commitment to impregnate her in that very case.
However, the fact that he impregnates her is a violation of the primary obligation
not to impregnate her. We therefore abandon rule (QR).21 Furthermore, we extend
our language as discussed in Section 3 and add rules (FDp), (FDi), (Ep), (CTDR),
(fV) and (oV-Ei). The new logic is dubbed CDPM.2d. For reasons which are
explicated later (cp. page 14) we present an alternative version of our logic by
replacing (S) with the following restricted version
⊢
(
O(A | B ∧ C) ∧ P(A | ¬B ∧ C)
)
⊃ O(B ⊃ A | C) (PS’)
We dub this logic CDPM.2e. Both logics, CDPM.2d and CDPM.2e serve as
candidates for our lower limit logics.
The semantics for these systems can be found in the Appendix.
5 Handling detachment adaptively
As already explicated at the end of Section 3, the idea is to apply factual de-
tachment to O(A | B) and B for proper (resp. instrumental) obligations on the
condition that
p
¬O(A | B) (resp.
i
¬O(A | B)) is not derivable. This is realized by
the following adaptive logic:
19It validates all instances of ⊢
`
O(B | A)∧P(C | A)∧P(B | A)
´
⊃ O(B | A∧C) (PRatMono).
That (PRatMono) is counter-intuitive can be demonstrated by means of our asparagus example:
if we add the intuitive premise P(¬f | ⊤), then the counter-intuitive O(¬f | a) is derivable.
This defect is not fatal though: I proposed in [16] a version of CDPM.1 which overcomes this
shortcoming.
20This principle (cp. [9]) can be stated in terms of the language for dyadic deontic used in this
paper as follows: ⊢
`
O(B | A) ∧ P(C | A)
´
⊃ O(B | A ∧ C). It is verified in dyadic standard
deontic logic. Goble is aware of the fact that his (WRM) leads to counter-intuitive, even explosive
behaviour in some cases (for instance take our asparagus example and replace O(f | a) by P(f | a)
and add P(¬f ∧ a | ⊤)). I offered an improvement based on the idea of conditionally applying
(SA) within an adaptive logic which is able to avoid these problems (cp. Section 6).
21The reader might further object that (CN) (in a similar way as (QR)) is not very intuitive
or give philosophically minded reasons why we should abandon it as well. Goble’s intention is to
stay as close as possible to standard deontic logic. However, (CN) is neither an essential part of
his logic nor in any way essential to our approach and may thus be disregarded as well.
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Definition 4. DCDPMα where α ∈ {d, e} is defined as an adaptive logic in
standard format by the following triple:
• the lower limit logic is CDPM.2α;
• the set of abnormalities is Ωd
• the strategy is minimal abnormality.
5.1 Some examples
Let us demonstrate the way the logic works by having a look at some examples.
Example (G cp. page 10). We already stated a proof for the case of the Gentle
Murderer on page 10.22 Note that there is no way to extend the proof in such a
way that lines 7 and 8 are marked, i.e. there is no way to derive i¬O(g | k) and
p
¬O(¬k | ⊤) as part of minimal Dab-consequences in our lower limit CDPM.2α
(α ∈ {d, e}). Therefore, Oig and Op¬k are finally derivable.
Example (PA cp. page 4). The following proof is valid for both adaptive logics:
1 O(¬b | ⊤) PREM ∅
2 O(a | b) PREM ∅
3 b PREM ∅
54 Oi¬b 1; (FDi)c {O(¬b | ⊤) ∧ i¬O(¬b | ⊤)}
5 O(¬b | ⊤) ∧ i¬O(¬b | ⊤) 1, 3; (fV) ∅
6 Oia 2, 3; (FDi)
c {O(a | b) ∧ i¬O(a | b)}
7 Opa 2, 3; (FDp)
c {O(a | b) ∧
p
¬O(a | b)}
8 Op¬b 1; (FDp)c {O(¬b | ⊤) ∧
p
¬O(¬b | ⊤)}
At lines 4, 6–8 we have conditional applications of factual detachment. Note
that the first one gets marked, since its condition, O(¬b | ⊤)∧ i¬O(¬b | ⊤), is derived
on the empty condition at line 5. The other ones however are finally derivable.
5.2 Deontic detachment and two intuitions concerning proper obliga-
tions
I postponed a discussion why rule (QR) was abandoned and why rule (S) was
restricted to (PS’) for CDPM.2e. Taking a look at the Chisholm example will
illuminate these points: let i stand for John impregnating Diane, and m for him
marrying her. We first take a look at a proof for DCDPMd:
1 O(¬i | ⊤) PREM ∅
2 O(¬m | ¬i) PREM ∅
3 O(m | i) PREM ∅
4 i PREM ∅
5 i¬O(¬i | ⊤) 1, 4; (fV) ∅
6 O(¬i ⊃ ¬m | ⊤) 2; (S) ∅
7 P(¬i ∧ ¬m | ⊤) PREM ∅
8 O(¬i ∧ ¬m | ⊤) 1, 6, 7; (CPAND) ∅
9 O(¬m | ⊤) 7, 8; (RCPM) ∅
10
p
¬O(m | i) 3, 8; (CTDR) ∅
11 i¬O(¬m | ⊤) 3, 4, 9; (oV-Ei) ∅
12 Oim 3, 4; (FDi)
c {O(m | i) ∧ i¬O(m | i)}
13 Op¬i 1; (FDp)c {O(¬i | ⊤) ∧
p
¬O(¬i | ⊤)}
14 Op¬m 9; (FDp)c {O(¬m | ⊤) ∧
p
¬O(¬m | ⊤)}
22Lines 1–5 are not stated in the form of an adaptive logic proof. It can be easily adjusted
though by simply adding the empty condition ∅ as a fourth column.
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What follows is a continuation of the proof from line 5 on in DCDPMe:
6 Oim 3, 4; (FDi)
c {O(m | i) ∧ i¬O(m | i)}
7 Op¬i 1; (FDp)c {O(¬i | ⊤) ∧
p
¬O(¬i | ⊤)}
8 Opm 3, 4; (FDp)
c {O(m | i) ∧
p
¬O(m | i)}
Note that (Ep) is not applicable to O(m | i) and i in order to derive
p
¬O(¬i | ⊤)
since we are missing the additional, though counter-intuitive premise P(i | ⊤). In
case of the first proof we have
p
¬O(m | i), since (CTDR) is applied to O(¬i∧¬m | ⊤)
and O(m | i). In the second proof however we have no means to derive O(¬i∧¬m |
⊤). Therefore the conditional application of (FDp) to O(m | i) is not blocked and
thus Opm is finally derivable. Not so in the first proof, where this application is
blocked at line 10. However here O(¬m | ⊤) is derivable and (FDp) is applied to
this obligation: as a consequence we arrive at the proper obligation Op¬m at line
14.
What is the correct result? What about the solution offered by DCDPMd?
This logic allows for the following versions of deontic detachment (DD):23
O(A | C) P(A ∧B | C) O(B | A ∧ C)
O(B | C)
(DDP1)
O(A | ⊤) P(A ∧B | ⊤) O(B | A)
O(B | ⊤)
(DDP⊤1)
This enables the logic to derive O(¬m | ⊤) from the given obligations O(¬i | ⊤) and
O(¬m | ¬i) (and the harmless permission statement P(¬i∧¬m | ⊤)). From this we
immediately get O(¬i ∧ ¬m | ⊤) which makes O(m | i) a strong CTD-obligation.
Note that the commitment O(¬m | ¬i) not to marry Diane, which is given as
premise on the condition that he doesn’t impregnate her, is in this logic treated
as the general obligation not to marry her, O(¬m | ⊤), which would be violated
in case he impregnates her. Indeed, i is a violation context for O(¬m | ⊤) since
we have O(m | i) and O(¬i | ⊤) which is equivalent to ¬P(i | ⊤).24 Thus, in this
logic the commitment not to marry her is a proper obligation which is in conflict
with the instrumental CTD-obligation to marry her. The latter is in force since
its condition, him having impregnated her, is fulfilled. More generally speaking:
the logic elevates, via deontic detachment, commitments on conditions stating that
a proper obligation is fulfilled, such as O(¬m | ¬i), to be proper obligations, e.g.
Op¬m. Deontic detachment has quite some intuitive appeal as well as the thought
that, if A is a proper obligation and you are committed to bring about B in case
A, then also B should be a candidate for being a proper obligation.
However, this is not so in the second logic. Indeed, there is an alternative
intuition. In the case of DCDPMe the deontic detachment is blocked, since this
logic only supports a weaker form of (DD):
O(A | C) P(A ∧B | C) P(B | ¬A ∧ C) O(B | A ∧ C)
O(B | C)
(DDP2)
O(A | ⊤) P(A ∧B | ⊤) P(B | ¬A) O(B | A)
O(B | ⊤)
(DDP⊤2)
23The second is a consequence of the first one, which can easily be shown.
24This refers to case (b) in our definition of violation contexts. It is interesting to notice that
violation contexts of type (b) give rise to CTD-obligations (in case the aggregation principle is
valid): in our example i defines a violation context to O(¬m | ⊤) since we have O(m | i) and
O(¬i | ⊤). By aggregation we get O(¬m ∧ ¬i | ⊤). O(m | i) is a strong CTD-obligation to the
latter.
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In favour of this approach may be argued that, after all, the obligation not to
marry her was stated only on the condition that he doesn’t impregnate her. This
is clearly weaker than O(¬m | ⊤), not to marry her in general. While it seems
harmless to derive this commitment in case of P(¬m | i), in our case it is critical.
After all O(m | i) is only a weak CTD-obligation to O(¬i | ⊤): thus to marry
her in case of him impregnating her shouldn’t be considered as a violation of a
primary obligation (unlike the gentle killing in the Forrester paradox) but rather
as a proper obligation in a violation context, similarly to our intuition which tells
us in the (PA) example that it is not just an instrumental but rather a proper
obligation to apologize in sub-ideal situation of the broken promise. This logic
reflects therefore the difference between stating O(¬m | ⊤) and stating O(¬m | ¬i)
on the level of proper and instrumental obligations.
1 O(¬i | ⊤)
2 O(¬m | ¬i)
3 O(m | i)
4 i
O(¬i | ⊤) is violated Op¬i
5 O(¬m | ⊤)
6 O(¬m ∧ ¬i | ⊤)
(DD)
to 1+3
O(m | i) is
a strong CTD (w.r.t. 6)
Oim
O(m | i) is
a weak CTD (w.r.t. 1)
O(¬m | ⊤) is violated Op¬m Opm
yes no
Figure 2: Two ways of dealing with Chisholm’s problem. Left: the treatment in
DCDPMd, Right: the treatment in DCDPMe.
I leave it to the reader to settle for one of the two intuitions and pick the
corresponding logic.
I add one more example (F) to underline the role played by deontic detach-
ment and also strengthening of the antecedent in the derivation of proper and
instrumental obligations.
F1 There must be no fence.—O(¬f | ⊤)
F2 There must be a white fence, if there is a fence.—O(w ∧ f | f)
F3 There must be a fence, if there is a dog.—O(f | d)
F4 It is allowed to have a dog.—P(d | ⊤)
F5 There is a fence and a dog.—f ∧ d
Let us take a look at a proof for example (F):
1 O(¬f | ⊤) PREM ∅
2 O(w ∧ f | f) PREM ∅
3 O(f | d) PREM ∅
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4 P(d | ⊤) PREM ∅
5 d PREM ∅
6
p
¬O(w ∧ f | f) 1,2;(CTDR) ∅
7
p
¬O(¬f | ⊤) 1,3,4,5;(Ep) ∅
8 i¬O(¬f | ⊤) 1,3,5;(oV-Ei) ∅
9 Opf 3,5;(FDp)
c {O(f | d) ∧
p
¬O(f | d)}
10 Oif 3,5;(FDi)
c {O(f | d) ∧ i¬O(f | d)}
So far the logic derives the desired consequences. However, the reader might
wonder if not also the obligation to bring about w ∧ f should be detached. We
cannot apply detachment to O(w ∧ f | f) since its condition is not fulfilled and
even if that were so, we derived
p
¬O(w ∧ f | f). Let us add the harmless premise
P(w ∧ f | d):25
11 P(w ∧ f | d) PREM ∅
12 O(w ∧ f | f ∧ d) 2,11;(WRM) ∅
13 O(w ∧ f | d) 3,11,12;(DDP1) ∅
14 Op(w ∧ f) 5,13;(FDp)c {O(w ∧ f | d) ∧
p
¬O(w ∧ f | d)}
15 Oi(w ∧ f) 5,13;(FDi)c {O(w ∧ f | d) ∧ i¬O(w ∧ f | d)}
The reader can see that by strengthening of the antecedent at line 12 the obli-
gation in question can be derived on the more restricted condition f ∧ d. This
enables us to apply deontic detachment in order to arrive at O(w∧f | d). Now the
detachment cannot be blocked anymore. Thus, despite the fact that O(w ∧ f | f)
is a CTD-obligation, this obligation can be detached since it can be derived also
for the context d, which is the factual situation presented by the premises. This
behaviour of the logic is intuitive.
It is left to the reader to proof that in case F5 is replaced by f ∧ ¬d we get
Op¬f and Oi(w ∧ f) as consequences. This is as expected, since “[w]hat is most
striking about the fence example [. . . ] is the observation that when the premise
O(¬f | ⊤) is violated by f , then the obligation for ¬f should be derivable, but not
when O(¬f | ⊤) is overridden by the exception f ∧ d” ([20] p. 71).
6 Some enhancements and refinements
In this section I introduce some useful ways of enhancing our adaptive system.
Due to space limitations the explications in this section are more of a suggestive
nature though they are precise and explicit enough to guide the interested reader
in a concrete realization.
6.1 More adaptiveness
Applying aggregation and inheritance conditionally As pointed out in [17]
and [16], one of the disadvantages of Goble’s monadic logicsDPM and of his dyadic
generalizations CDPM is that, in order to apply inheritance and aggregation,
additional premises have to be added by the user of the logic. This is sub-optimal in
the sense that as much reasoning as possible should be performed by the logic and,
inversely, as less as possible should be left to the user. Especially in complicated
settings the adding of premises can be very bothersome for the user, since in such
cases it is in no way a trivial question whether the addition of a certain permission
statement leads to explosion or otherwise unintuitive consequences.
In [17] and [16] adaptive logics on the basis of Goble’s systems were developed
which perform this task instead of the user: inheritance and aggregation are applied
conditionally. Remember, that in order to achieve tolerance concerning deontic
25In DCDPMe we would have to add another additional premise, P(w ∧ f | d ∧ ¬f), in order
to derive O(w ∧ f | d) analogously.
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conflicts, Goble added the constraint P(A ∧ B | C) to the aggregation rule of
standard deontic logic. This means that the aggregation is applied only in cases
where it does not produce a deontic conflict. The idea of the adaptive logic is now
to apply aggregation on the condition that no deontic conflict would result from
it. Therefore the set of abnormalities Ω∧ =df {O(A | C)∧O(B | C)∧O(¬(A∧B) |
C) | A,B,C ∈ P} and the minimal abnormality strategy are employed. Note that
the following is valid in Goble’s CDPM systems:
O(A | C) ∧ O(B | C) ⊢ O(A ∧B | C) ∨
(
O(A | C) ∧ O(B | C) ∧ O(¬(A ∧B) | C)
)
This allows us to derive O(A∧B | C) from O(A | C) and O(B | C) on the condition
{O(A | C)∧O(B | C)∧O(¬(A∧B) | C)}. Similarly, as the reader may easily verify,
this enables us to apply inheritance conditionally: in case A ⊢ B, from O(A | C)
we get O(B | C) on the condition {O(A | C) ∧ O(A | C) ∧ O(¬A | C)}.
By adjusting the marking conditions, it is technically very straightforward to
realize a sequential adaptive logic, with this logic being the first and our adaptive
logic for detachment being the second logic. This way the advantages of both
systems may be combined.
Let us take another look at the proof for the Chisholm example on page 14.
In order to derive O(¬i ∧ ¬m | ⊤) from O(¬i | ⊤) and O(¬i ⊃ ¬m | ⊤) by
(CPAND) we had to introduce the additional permission statement P(¬i∧¬m | ⊤)
at line 7. Furthermore, in order to apply inheritance to O(¬i ∧ ¬m | ⊤) to derive
O(¬m | ⊤) we were again in need of P(¬i ∧ ¬m | ⊤). However, using the adaptive
logic introduced in this section, the user is not in need of adding this permission
by hand. The logic conditionally applies aggregation and inheritance as follows
(where X = O(¬i | ⊤) ∧ O(¬i ⊃ ¬m | ⊤) ∧ O(¬(¬i ∧ ¬m) | ⊤)) :
7′ O(¬i ∧ ¬m | ⊤) 1, 6; (CPAND)c {X}
8′ O(¬m | ⊤) 7′; (RCPM)c {X}
Applying (SA) conditionally Lou Goble’s version of strengthening the an-
tecedent is not without problems. Take for instance the asparagus example, O(¬f |
⊤) and P(f | a), and add the, in no way counter-intuitive, premise P(¬f ∧ a | ⊤).
This leads to explosion applying (WRM) to O(¬f | ⊤) and P(¬f ∧ a | ⊤), as the
reader can easily verify. This demonstrates that Goble’s system is not fully able to
deal with specifity cases.
Analogously to the adaptive treatment of the inheritance principle we can emply
an adaptive logic to apply (SA) as much as possible. We therefore define the set
of abnormalities ΩSA =df {O(B | A) ∧ P(B | A ∧ C) ∧ ¬O(B | A ∧ C)}. The
strategy is minimal abnormality and as lower limit one of the CDPM variants
introduced in this paper can be used. In this logic it is possible to conditionally
derive O(B | A ∧ C) from O(B | A) and P(B | A ∧ C).
Again, this system can, in a straightforward way be combined with the other
adaptive logics introduced this paper. This is left as an easy exercise to the reader.
6.2 Deontic conflicts
Our logic DCDPM has a feature that some readers might find troublesome: con-
flicts at the level of conditional obligations may be inherited to the level of proper
or instrumental obligations. Take for instance the conflicting setting O(a | ⊤) and
O(b | ⊤) (where a ⊢ ¬b). In this case Opa ∧ Opb is a DCDPM-consequence (and
analogously Oia∧Oib). There are reasons to see this as counter-intuitive or dubious
on philosophical grounds: we should not have conflicting proper or instrumental
obligations. This defect is not fatal, the logic can be adjusted in a way to avoid such
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consequences. Therefore we alter the rules for factual detachment in the following
way (where x ∈ {p, i}):
O(A | B) P(A | B) B ¬ x¬O(A | B)
OxA
(FDPx)
Rule (FDPx) ensures by means of the additional constraint P(A | B) that factual
detachment is only applied to non-conflicting conditional obligations.
Not do derive any actual obligation in the face of two conflicting obligations
which are not overridden is of course too weak. But note that in our adaptive
strengthenings of Goble’s CDPM introduced in Section 6.1, we can derive for
instance O(a ∨ b | ⊤) ∧ P(a ∨ b | ⊤) from O(a | ⊤) and O(b | ⊤). This enables us
to derive Ox(a ∨ b) by (FDPx). This certainly is as desired.
Similarly in the case that O(a | ⊤) is being overridden by O(¬a | c) and c:
by our adaptive handling of (SA) introduced in Section 6.1 we are able to derive
O(b | c) in case we know that b is allowed under the circumstances described by c.
In this case we apply (FDPx) to O(b | c) and P(b | c) and derive the desired Oxb.
7 Conclusion
In this paper I proposed a generic way to turn a given dyadic deontic logic into an
adaptive logic which models detachment. I elaborated two intuitions concerning
what obligations should be detached: proper and instrumental obligations. Obliga-
tions which are not overridden by more specific obligations bind us also in cases in
which they are violated and are therefore considered to be proper obligations. In-
strumental obligations are a more pragmatic concept: taking the factual premises
as immutable, we can ask ourselves the question, what is the best thing to do?
For instance contrary-to-duty obligations indicate instrumental obligations, while
the primary obligations which may be violated do not cease to bind as as proper
obligations. Paradigmatically I presented an adaptive logic based on Lou Goble’s
conflict-tolerant CDPM system which implements the ideas presented before.
APPENDIX
Semantics for the dyadic systems CDPM.1c and CDPM.2c are introduced by Goble
in [5]. As in [17] we use an actual world variant of the semantics in order to deal with
factual premises.
Let a dyadic neighborhood frame F be a pair 〈W,wa,O〉 where W is a set of worlds,
wa ∈ W is the actual world, and O assigns to each world a ∈ W a set of ordered
propositions, i.e. Oa ⊆ ℘W × ℘W . A model M on a frame F is a pair 〈F, v〉 where
v(p) ⊆W for each propositional letter p. We define M |= ϕ iff M,wa |= ϕ. Furthermore,
where a ∈W , we have the following requirements:
M,a |= p iff a ∈ v(p), where p is a propositional letter (S-p)
M,a |= O(A | B) iff 〈|B|M , |A|M 〉 ∈ Oa (S-O)
〈|B|M , |A|M 〉 ∈ Oa or M,a |=
x
¬O(A | B) where x ∈ {i, p} (S-Ox)
M,a |= P(A | B) iff 〈|B|M , |A|M 〉 /∈ Oa (S-P)
where |A|M =df {a ∈ W |M,a |= A} and W ′ =df W \W
′ for W ′ ⊆ W . For the classical
connectives the definitions are as usual:
M,a |= ¬ϕ iff M,a 2 ϕ (S-¬)
M,a |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M,a |= ϕ or M,a |= ψ (S-∨)
M,a |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,a |= ϕ and M,a |= ψ (S-∧)
M,a |= ϕ ⊃ ψ iff M,a |= ¬ϕ ∨ ψ (S-⊃)
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In order to define our CDPM systems we also need the following rules:
〈W,W 〉 ∈ Oa (S-CN)
If Y ⊆ Z and 〈X,Y 〉 ∈ Oa and 〈X,Y 〉 /∈ Oa then 〈X,Z〉 ∈ Oa (S-RCPM)
If 〈X,Y 〉 ∈ Oa, for any Y ⊆W, then 〈X,X〉 ∈ Oa (S-QR)
If 〈X ∩ Y, Z〉 ∈ Oa, then 〈X,Y ∪ Z〉 ∈ Oa (S-S)
If 〈X,Y 〉 ∈ Oa and 〈X,Y ∩ Z〉 /∈ Oa, then 〈X ∩ Z, Y 〉 ∈ Oa (S-WRM)
If 〈X,Y 〉 ∈ Oa, 〈X,Z〉 ∈ Oa and 〈X,Y ∩ Z〉 /∈ Oa, then 〈X,Y ∩ Z〉 ∈ Oa (S-CPAND)
〈X, ∅〉 ∈ Oa (S-CP)
For the f -version of our system we add
If 〈X ∩ Z, Y 〉 ∈ Oa and 〈Y ∩ Z,X〉 /∈ Oa, then 〈Z, Y ∪X〉 ∈ Oa (S-PS’)
The following rules give an accurate account of detachment:
If M,a |= B,O(A | B) and M,a 2 x¬O(A | B) then M,a |= O
xA (S-FDx)
If M,a |= B ∧ C,P(C | B),O(A | B),P(D | B ∧ C) ∨ O(D | B ∧ C)
and |D|M ⊆ |A|M , then M,a |=
p
¬O(A | B)
(S-Ep)
If M,a |= O(A | B ∧ C),O(D | B), and |D|M ⊆ |B ∧ C|M , |D|M ⊆ |A|M ,
then M,a |=
p
¬O(A | B ∧ C)
(S-CTDR)
If M,a |= O(A | B) ∧B and M,a 2 A, then M,a |= i¬O(A | B) (S-fV)
If M,a |= B ∧ C,O(A | B),P(D | B ∧ C) ∨ O(D | B ∧ C)
and |D|M ⊆ |A|M , then M,a |=
i
¬O(A | B)
(S-oV-Ei)
Theorem 1. Logics CDPM.2c, CDPM.2d and CDPM.2e are sound and complete
with respect to their corresponding class of frames which are as follows: For CDPM.2c
we take rules (S-p), (S-¬), (S-∨), (S-∧), (S-⊃), (S-O), (S-P), (S-CN), (S-CPAND),
(S-RCPM), (S-QR), (S-S), (S-WRM). For CDPM.2d we disregard (S-QR) and add
furthermore (S-Ox), (S-FDx) (for x ∈ {i, p}), (S-Ep), (S-CTDR), (S-fV) and (S-oV-Ei).
CDPM.2e is like CDPM.2d with the exception of (S-S) which is replaced by (S-PS’).
Proof. This can be proven analogous to the way completeness and correctness was proven
in [5] for CDPM.2c.
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